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1 Introduction 
In 1982 Time Magazine made the computer ‘Machine of the Year’. Until then, famous people such as Ronald 
Reagan, Lech Walesa and Ayatullah Khomeini had been chosen as ‘Man of the Year’. That tradition was 
continued after 1982. Interestingly, in 2006 it was again the computer that appeared on the cover of Time 
magazine in its yearly election of the ‘Person of the Year’. However, now it said, ‘You.’ ‘Yes you. You control the 
Information Age. Welcome to your world.’ This change from making the computer the machine of the year to a 
statement in which it is assumed to be necessary to make explicit that humans are in control illustrates that 
indeed, there can be doubts who is in control. Interaction with a computer in a human-like way, in particular, using 
natural language, has been the topic of research since the time of the early computers. Chatbots, question-
answering systems and dialogue systems, have been designed and during the 1980s and the 1990s of the 
previous century such systems have been demonstrated in research environments and have shown their (very) 
limited use in chatbots that are offered at web pages or spoken language systems that give access, by telephone, 
to certain information services. There is no way that a user can be considered to be in control. The user has to 
adapt to the system, he or she is commanded to provide information at a time and in a way the system is 
assumed to be able to understand. And most of the time the system does not understand. Spontaneous speech 
cannot be understood and in situations where there are several speakers interacting with each other – a 
multiparty interaction situation - it is yet impossible for a computer interaction system that plays a role as a 
computational partner (speaker, listener, both) to determine how, for example, the turn taking process takes place 
and when and how to place an interruption. However, exactly these topics have received lots of attention in 
European research projects in the previous years and it has become clear how difficult it is to model natural 
human-human interaction and to replace one of the humans in human-human interaction by a computational 
agent .such that we have human-like human-artificial agent interaction. 
Despite slow progress in natural and human-like human-computer interaction, it nevertheless remains a main 
research aim. Progress in speech and natural language processing research has halted. Our ability to model 
speech processes and natural language understanding has not progressed in the last twenty years, except when 
you are willing to measure this progress in promilles rather than in percents. Nevertheless there is optimism when 
looking at modeling human-computer interaction, in particular when looking at modeling nonverbal aspects of 
such interaction. New sensor technology has made it possible to track nonverbal interaction cues and activities. 
Current research activity, for example in various large-scale European research projects, is aiming at using 
sensor technology and sensor data interpretation of nonverbal aspects of human-human interaction and of human 
behavior activity in general. Again, as has been the leading principle of research in the past, the assumption is 
that we can model human-human interaction, preferably in a multi-party interaction setting, and that this 
knowledge can be used to design more ‘natural’ interfaces between humans and computer-supported 
environments in ‘daily-life’ situations. 
As discussed in [10,15,17] in the future our daily life interactions with other people, with computers, robots and 
smart environments will be recorded and interpreted by computers or embedded intelligence in environments, 
furniture, robots, displays, and wearables. These sensors record our activities, our behavior, and our interactions. 
Fusion of such information and reasoning about such information makes it possible, using computational models 
of human behavior and activities, to provide context- and person-aware interpretations of human behavior and 
activities, including determination of attitudes, moods, and emotions. Sensors include cameras, microphones, eye 
trackers, position and proximity sensors, tactile or smell sensors, et cetera. Sensors can be embedded in an 
environment, but they can also move around, for example, if they are part of a mobile social robot or if they are 
part of devices we carry around or are embedded in our clothes or body. Clearly, we may assume that in the 
future these sensors and their embedded intelligence are connected and this allows reasoning about and 
interpretation of a person’s activities, behavior and interactions in a comprehensive way, leaving no aspect of his 
or her life hidden. Our daily life behavior and daily life interactions are recorded and interpreted. The general aim 
of such research is to equip environments and devices with intelligence that supports their inhabitants or their 
users in their activities. The environment can support the user in a reactive or in a pro-active way. That is, the 
environment can observe the user and his or her activities, can draw conclusions about a mental or physical state 
of the user, can draw conclusions about the intentions of the user (knowing about a user’s preferences, an 
interaction history, a current mental state) and can then decide to offer or suggest the user certain alternatives to 
choose from, or to adapt the interface to the affective state of the user (where adaption includes offering different 
interaction modalities or ways to use them). 
How can we use such environments and how can such environments use us? Do we always want to cooperate 
with these environments; do these environments always want to cooperate with us? In this paper we argue that 
there are many reasons that users or rather human partners of these environments do want to keep information 
about their intentions and their emotions hidden from these smart environments. On the other hand, their artificial 
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interaction partner may have similar reasons to not give away all information they have or to treat their human 
partner as an opponent rather than someone that has to be supported by smart technology. 
This will be elaborated in the forthcoming sections. In the next sections we will survey examples of human-
computer interactions where there is not necessarily a goal to be explicit about intentions and feelings. In 
subsequent sections we will look at (1) the computer as a conversational partner, (2) the computer as a butler or 
diary companion, (3) the computer as a teacher or a trainer, acting in a virtual training environment (a serious 
game), (4) sports applications (that are not necessarily different from serious game or education environments), 
and games and entertainment applications. In all these examples it sometimes can be useful or even necessary 
to hide feelings and intentions. In some examples the ‘game’ includes not showing emotions, not being honest, or 
not being cooperative. Conversations, training, and games suppose some cooperation or ‘common ground’. The 
computer can be our opponent, our trainer, or someone we don’t agree with but who we need to convince in a 
negotiation process. There may also be situations where we simply don’t trust the decisions of the intelligence 
that is embedded in our environments. That is, assume a situation where we think we know better than the 
computer and because of that, can we overrule the computer? 
2. Cooperation and Non-Cooperation 
2.1 Grice and Cooperation 
We should start our observations with an acknowledgement to the Gricean principles that have been followed by 
Q&A and natural language dialogue systems. The main assumption is that users are cooperative. In [6] this is 
called the Cooperative Principle: Make your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by 
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. Speakers (generally) observe 
the cooperative principle, and listeners (generally) assume that speakers are observing it (conversational 
implicature). Grice also introduced some Conversational Maxims, such as the Maxim of Quantity: Make your 
contribution to the conversation as informative as necessary; and Do not make your contribution to the 
conversation more informative than necessary. There are other Maxims. The Maxim of Quality: Do not say what 
you believe to be false; and Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. The Maxim of Relevance: Be 
relevant (i.e., say things related to the current topic of the conversation). And, the Maxim of Manner: Avoid 
obscurity of expression; Avoid ambiguity; Be brief; and Be orderly. 
Clearly, although Grice was talking about human-human interaction, one can imagine how attractive these rules 
are from the point of view of human-computer interaction, where there is already more than enough difficulty for 
the computer to understand short task-oriented commands and where we certainly don’t want these command 
hidden in obscure, ambiguous, and non-relevant information that maybe has to be understood before it can be 
discarded. Obviously, this Gricean view has been attacked, extended and refined. There have been discussions 
about these principles and maxims and whether they are descriptive and prescriptive, refinements have been 
introduced that include ethical considerations and refinements have been introduced that look at the importance 
of nonverbal communication and how nonverbal signals should be included in these views (see e.g. [1]). Many 
researchers looked at ways to model mutual and cooperative understanding of face-to-face human-human 
understanding. And, they were quite willing to look beyond these Gricean principles. What makes it possible that 
we are able to deal with indirect speech acts [23] or with politeness expressions [12]? The use of humor during 
conversations is another topic that has been addressed [14].Using indirect speech acts, being polite, or using 
humor are examples where conversational partners do not follow the Gricean rules, while certainly, these are 
examples of natural interaction behavior. We will return to these issues in the next sections. 
But, it can be concluded that since the 1970’s the majority of dialogue or interaction system researchers have 
been working on modeling the information that is shared by conversational partners. Each new contribution to the 
interaction is interpreted in the context of the shared information and requires an update of this shared 
information. Principles of ‘grounding’ [4], shared plans [7] and joint intentions [5] have been introduced. Indeed, 
the majority of research on modeling human-human interaction and on applying these models for human-
computer interaction necessarily assumes cooperation and modeling some mutual understanding about what is 
being discussed between conversational participants. Some exceptions will be discussed in forthcoming 
subsections. 
As mentioned before, there are many situations where people don’t follow the Gricean rules. That may be 
because of, for example, self interest, indifference, competition, politeness or respect. People may aim, 
consciously or unconsciously, at keeping the interaction going, rather than on aiming at satisfying the Gricean 
maxims. And, there are many real-life interaction situations that we want to model in human-computer or human-
robot interaction where the computer, the social robot, or the virtual human may disagree with us, consider us an 
opponent rather than acting as a virtual agent that always agrees with us and performs our wishes, or simply tries 
to persuade us to do or forget about doing certain things. We can find such situations in electronic commerce 
applications, ‘negotiation’ situations, daily life conversations, training and sports situations, and game and 
entertainment situations. These situations will be discussed next. 
2.2 Conversations and Dialogues 
When we look at existing conversational systems it is clear that users have to adapt to the system and no natural 
conversation can take place. Users of these systems are assumed to be cooperative and in practice also start 
with showing empathy to the system. Unfortunately, an artificial system is not able to handle this helpfulness, it 
gets confused, and it bothers the user with its stupidity. In current Question-Answering (Q&A) systems the 
computer has the initiative and the user has to adapt to a system with poor language understanding, poor speech 
understanding, and no interaction understanding. Let alone any understanding by the system of context, affective 
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content and user preferences. Nevertheless, task-oriented Q&A systems can be presented in such a way that a 
user adapts in a rather natural way to the limitations of a system. Current limitations are not knowing about the 
user, the task, the context, and the preferences of a user. In fact, not knowing about everything a user finds 
important, except for that one particular question the user is asking and that probably gets misunderstood by the 
system since the user does not know about the way the system expects him or her to formulate a question. As an 
extreme example consider the ALICE conversational system. ALICE is a general conversational system that is 
well-known and has been rewarded for its performance, while hardly any scientific natural language dialogue 
research has been included in the system. On the other hand, because of their task and domain-dependent 
nature, no existing dialogue system can perform as well as ALICE in a conversational setting. Let’s look at an 
example of an Alice dialogue that came up when we researched the possibility of a virtual diary companion for 
soldiers who performed a mission in Afghanistan. The virtual diary companion was designed to provide empathic 
support to soldiers, stimulating them to express their feelings while making entries in the diary [16]. While looking 
at its possible performance we also looked at the possibility of using ALICE for this task, but stopped considering 
ALICE after seeing the following conversation: 
Human: I've had a terrible day. 
ALICE: What happened to it? 
Human: First we were under attack. 
ALICE: And then what happened? And second? 
Human: Then our vehicle struck a landmine. 
ALICE: Fascinating. It would be nice if our vehicle struck a landmine. 
Human: Then my best friend got killed. 
ALICE: Good reasoning. How well do you know this person? 
Despite the low-quality speech and language processing technology that we have today, it is assumed, and at 
least topic of research, that in the future there is the possibility to have dialogue and conversational systems that 
will be used and will be appreciated by their users. This may be expected because the system learns to know 
about the user from his or her interaction history including preferences, interests, and attitudes. Moreover, apart 
from speech and language, there are other modalities that provide information from user to system. Gestures, 
facial expressions, body postures, gaze behavior, and other information that can be measured (e.g., 
(neuro)physiological information) can be used by a conversational system to keep the conversation going or to 
provide a dialogue system with the information to provide relevant feedback. It should be mentioned that in 
several human-human interaction studies it has been shown that there are situations where nonverbal cues are 
more important in conveying a speaker’s message than the meaning of the words that are used. This is in 
particular true when attitudes or feelings are communicated. Cf. Mehrabian [13] who introduced the following rule: 
“Total Liking = 7% Verbal Liking + 38% Vocal Liking + 55% Facial Liking.” In case of incongruities appearing in 
the modalities with which a message is communicated, the nonverbal modalities seem to be the most important. 
Consider the progress that is being made to make a computer a conversational partner. The computer can be 
represented as a virtual friend that knows about us and to whom we can talk in a confidential way. It may be a 
virtual butler that also knows about us and maybe even knows more about us than a real friend, but to whom we 
can talk to in a less confidential way. In real life, whoever we talk to, we don’t display all our feelings or are explicit 
about all our goals. We don’t provide all information we have. Sometimes that is to protect ourselves from 
unwanted intimacy; sometimes it is to protect our conversational partner from information that may be harmful for 
him or her. We keep back information, we lie, and we manipulate. There are studies that tell us how many ‘lies’ 
we are using every day. In many cases these ‘lies’ are functional. They are not that important and they keep the 
conversation going. When we have useful applications for virtual conversational partners, do we always want 
them to be completely honest and really mean what they say during a conversation? Wouldn’t that lead to very 
short conversations, while having a long and entertaining conversation should be the goal of the artificial 
conversational system? We think that our artificial conversational partner should be able to get the conversation 
going even when it is able to recognize consciously produced incomplete, incorrect or misleading information. An 
important question is whether it should show that it knows that the user is providing incomplete or misleading 
information, whether it should take advantage of it, or whether it should stay silent and act as a virtual butler that 
uses such information to better serve his or her human master.  
Poggi et al [19] studied deception. They introduce a typology of ways to deceive and they discuss the detection of 
deception in a multimodal, nonverbal communication setting. This framework is used to design virtual humans or 
embodied conversational agents that are able to deceive about their emotional state by using deceptive facial 
expressions. That is, they can fake, mask or inhibit expressions. A virtual human that is able to deceive about her 
emotional state by using deceptive facial and bodily expressions can play a useful role in conversations, 
negotiations, or other ways of (nonverbal) interaction (see also the next sections). 
Hence, we can conclude that in conversational settings, that is, in a setting where a virtual human or a social 
robot is used as a conversational partner, there are good reasons to have this artificial partner knowingly 
accepting that its human partner is not necessarily following the Gricean principles and adapts to a verbal and 
nonverbal exchange where it does not follow these rules itself (e.g. by displaying deceptive nonverbal behavior, 
rather than what could be considered spontaneous behavior). Detecting that a human conversational partner is 
not following these rules (consciously or unconsciously) is becoming possible by technology that senses all kinds 
of non-verbal communication information (from speech, gaze, head and body movements, and physiological 
information, including brain and muscle activity measurements. 
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2.3 Commerce, Negotiation, and Persuasion 
During daily conversations we are not always honest. These conversations do not necessarily have a particular 
aim. As discussed, one aim is to keep the conversation going. The situation is different when we consider verbal 
and nonverbal interaction between a human and an (embodied) agent in an electronic commerce setting. The aim 
of the agent, reflecting the aim of its designers and owners, can simply be to sell as many products and services 
as possible. Such an agent will not follow the Gricean cooperative principle. Neither will an agent that participates 
in an online auction or an agent that is meant to persuade a citizen to behave in a certain way. These agents take 
a certain perspective in their interaction and do not necessarily provide fully complete or fully correct information. 
They are not necessarily sincere. In their interaction with other agents or humans they have to decide when and 
how to honest and when and how to deceive and when and how to hide information. 
In [3] it is argued that “Agents are and will be designed, selected or trained to deceive, and people will be 
deceived by and will deceive their own agents.” For example, in multi-agent systems agents can be self-interested 
and if necessary will compete with other agents in order to achieve a task assigned to it by its user. In an auction 
an agent will not be honest about the price it is willing to pay if there is a chance to get a product cheaper. Even a 
personal assistant agent can decide to deceive its ‘owner’ or conceal certain information because it knows more 
about, among other things, legal consequences of actions, consequences for long-term goals and preferences 
that a user has, or consequences for health. Castelfranchi mentions various reasons why agents will deceive us 
and each other: for protecting secrets and privacy, for courtesy, for tutorial persuasion, and for protecting 
collective interests. Some of these reasons are ‘pro-social’ and can be seen as altruistic. Lying can be ethically 
justified and is not necessarily immoral. 
Clearly, similar to what we mentioned at the end of section 2.2, the agents need to be aware of their behavior and 
need to be able to make decisions about appropriate behavior. In the case of embodied agents or virtual humans 
their nonverbal behavior should be chosen in accordance to what they want to achieve. 
2.4 Teaching, Training, and Serious Games 
Computing intelligence and computing power can be embedded in a virtual teacher or a teaching environment. 
Teachers do not always act in an explicit cooperative way. It can be useful to provoke, challenge, or tease a 
student. It can be useful to use humor, to play the role of a non-understanding conversational partner and to 
display faked emotions. At the same time, a student interacting with a teacher or a virtual teacher has a strategy 
that aims at getting a good assessment of his or her knowledge and motivation. The computer-controlled virtual 
teacher needs to be aware of this. The student is not necessarily aware of the strategies of a human teacher or 
the strategies that have been included in a virtual educational environment and an embodied virtual teacher. 
Neither the student, nor the teacher is playing according the Gricean rules. There is nothing wrong with that, but 
in order to act natural and to be effective, a virtual teacher or teaching environment should be able to detect, 
analyze and synthesize such behavior in order to generate understanding and empathetic behavior in a virtual 
agent in order to take care of natural face-to-face interaction. Choosing between strategies has been the topic of 
research of our ‘Ines’ project [8]. In this project we have a student performing a nursing task on a virtual patient 
while being monitored by a virtual teacher, commenting on the performance of the student and trying to motivate 
the student by providing appropriate comments on the progress that is being made. Clearly, such comments are 
meant to play a role in the teaching process and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or the emotions of the 
teacher. 
Nowadays virtual reality environments are being used for teaching and training situations. In these environments 
events are simulated and trainees can ‘enter’ these environments in order to learn to collaborate with human or 
virtual team mates, enter into situations where they have to negotiate with human or virtual partners, or enter 
situations where they have to fight human or virtual opponents. An example of such a ‘serious’ or role-playing 
game is the virtual human doctor project [24,25]. The setting is a clinic somewhere in Iraq. The trainee is an army 
captain who has to persuade a doctor to move his clinic because of a planned military operation. This has to be 
done without revealing details of the military operation. Obviously, and being part of the training situation, the 
doctor is not necessarily cooperative. This requires the modeling of non-cooperative behavior. In [24] various 
factors have been distinguished and some of them have been implemented in such a virtual doctor. They include 
unilateral topic shifts or topic maintenance, avoidance, competition, unhelpful criticism, withholding of information, 
lying and deception, antagonism, and rejection of empathy. More globally, mentioned in [26,25], three orientations 
toward a negotiation can be distinguished: avoidance, distributive, and integrative. Here, ‘avoidance’ means trying 
to avoid the negotiation, denying the need for it. The ‘distributive’ orientation assumes that there is a winner and a 
loser, while in the ‘integrative’ orientation there can be a win-win situation. Each orientation needs different 
strategies. In the case of the virtual human doctor one can have the situation that there is ‘avoidance’ first, but it 
can change to the ‘distributive’ and after that to an ‘integrative’ orientation. In this research strategies are chosen 
based on an appraisal model of emotion that looks at these orientation strategies as types of coping strategies. 
At the end of section 2.2 and 2.3 we mentioned the need for virtual conversational agents that can process non-
Gricean behavior and that can behave themselves in a non-Gricean way. The underlying assumption was that we 
need such agents in order to model natural interactions between humans and virtual agents (virtual humans or 
social robots). Now, also at the end of this section we can mention that there are application areas for virtual 
humans (and social robots) where they have to play roles in simulated training or teaching environments, where 
they have to negotiate, and where they have to persuade, in both verbal and nonverbal ways. Being non-
cooperative and displaying deceptive expressions – as was studied in Poggi et al. [19] - are part of a virtual 
human’s behavior in these situations. 
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2.5 Sports, Games and Entertainment 
Presently we see research and the development of technology that aim at providing exercise and training 
environments. Sensors are able to detect human activity in rather detailed ways. Microphones detect speech and 
sound, cameras detect movements of the body, the limbs and changes of facial expressions, there are sensors 
that detect positions and proximities, and physiological sensors provide information about body and mental state 
of a user of these exercise or training environments. These environments aim at improving the health of their 
users, for example by displaying a motivating virtual environment, a virtual coach, and a fitness exercise program. 
Interpretation of the information obtained from the sensors allows the environment, probably represented by a 
virtual human, to match actual behavior with desired behavior, and to adapt its appearance and its feedback 
strategies to the performance of the user. In our research we looked at the modeling of a fitness trainer [21]. One 
of the things that we noticed is that a trainer needs to be aware that a user is not necessarily honest in his or her 
verbal or nonverbal attitude towards a trainer. He or she can hide fatigue or exaggerate fatigue. The virtual trainer 
has the possibility to know about this and has to decide how to deal with this. This includes deciding whether the 
trainer’s knowledge about a user’s deceptive behavior should be communicated to the user. It is not always in the 
interest of the user or the trainer to speak the truth. 
Fitness training using virtual environments and interactive virtual trainers receive much attention. A virtual trainer 
can monitor actual exercise performance and can match it with desired exercise performance. Other virtual 
environments are introduced to simulate situations that allow sportsmen to train and improve their performance 
during a real sports game. Virtual environments have been designed to simulate ice hockey, handball, boxing, or 
rugby situations. Exertion interfaces have been introduced that offer new sports or games that require physical 
efforts and ‘whole body interaction’ by the user of such interfaces. In these environments we have trainers, team 
mates, and opponents. 
In sports and games deceptive actions are part of the game. They are meant to divert attention from one’s real 
purpose. Hence, in virtual training and recreational environments a trainer or in particular a game opponent is not 
only allowed, but also expected to have nonverbal behavior that is aimed at deception. Just to mention an 
example, suppose we have a virtual fencing trainer. Its main job will be to exercise recognizing and generating 
deception behavior. Similarly, we can look at virtual or mediated boxers [9,18], baseball players [11] or rugby 
players [2]. Training environments have been built where a human handball keeper or a human rugby player has 
to deal with feinted attacks. 
Again here, similar to the conclusions of the previous subsections, in these situations we need agents that have 
underlying models of not being cooperative and models that aim at nonverbal misleading an interaction partner.  
2.6 Not Trusting the Computer 
Clearly, in many of the situations described above, the computer, or rather how it appears to us in our interaction 
activities, can interact with us in playful, exercise, entertainment, sports, and serious gaming environments. In 
these environments we can expect that situations we can expect that non-cooperative and deceiving behavior is 
there. It is part of a game, it is part of a training, and it is part of an exercise programme. It may be the case, and it 
was an essential theme in Stanley Kubrick’s movie 2001, that we simply do not trust an advice or a decision made 
by an extremely intelligent computer and that we verbally and nonverbally try to deceive this computer, assuming 
that we know better. In a well-known fragment of this movie one of the astronauts (Dave Bowman) takes the 
decision to hide his suspicion that HAL, the intelligent computer, is not able to handle a particular dangerous 
situation. Or, at least, not willing to handle this situation in the (life-saving) interest of the astronauts. Dave 
decides to discuss this situation with his co-pilot, but is not aware that HAL has eyes everywhere and is aware of 
this discussion. Later, trying to convince HAL to adapt the mission’s aims, HAL is able to confront Dave with this 
overheard discussion and refuses to make any changes to the mission. Nevertheless, Dave’s empathy, trying to 
understand HAL’s way of feeling and reasoning, turns out to be stronger than HAL’s understanding of Dave’s 
intentions. The ‘2001’ movie is science-fiction, but nevertheless. The discussion between Dave and HAL is about 
trust, mistrust and assuming that your conversational partner’s aim has interests others than your and tries to 
deceive you. 
HAL: This mission is too important for me to allow you to jeopardize it. 
DAVE BOWMAN: I don't know what you're talking about, HAL? 
HAL: I know you and Frank were planning to disconnect me, and I'm afraid that's something I cannot 
allow to happen. 
DAVE BOWMAN: Where the hell did you get that idea, HAL?  
HAL got that idea by observing Dave and Frank discussing how to deal with him while assuming their 
conversation was hidden from artificial eyes and ears sensors in the environment. Wrong idea, HAL knew. 
Clearly, here, we cannot say what has to be done. Do we want to negotiate with the computer, do we want to 
compromise, or do we want to overrule the computer whatever his arguments are? Or is it up to the computer to 
choose among these alternatives? Whatever we choose, interaction models aware of different perspectives, 
different aims and different truths need to be designed. 
2.7 On Being Believable 
There is another issue that needs to be addressed. Whenever we introduce a humanoid (virtual human or a social 
robot) to engage in an interaction with a human interaction partner, in today’s research our aim is to keep the 
interaction going, making the interaction believable and making the virtual character or the social robot believable 
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in its interaction with the human conversational partner. This aim can be traced back to the Turing Test. This test 
was introduced to measure progress in artificial intelligence. The test looked at intelligent expressed in a verbal 
way. When we have a human conversational partner and a computer communicating with a human ‘referee’, can 
this referee decide whether he has been communicating with the computer or with the human conversational 
partner? This test does allow all kinds of cheating from the part of the computer agent. Everything is allowed, as 
long as the human conversational partner accepts the verbal and nonverbal contributions of the computer agent 
as believable (for some time). In section 2.2 we displayed a conversation between the ALICE-bot and a human 
partner, and, clearly, the interaction is far from believable. All kinds of research attempts aim at making embodied 
conversational agents (virtual humans/social robots) more believably. This certainly includes modeling agents in 
such a way that they attempt to make their human conversational partners believe that they are more intelligent 
and more social than they really are. There are several strategies that can be used: displaying empathic and 
intelligent listening behavior, avoiding certain discussion topics, or changing the topic of discussion. In [20] we 
discuss behaviors and appearances of virtual humans in settings where there is not necessarily cooperation, 
trust, or empathic behavior. 
3 Conclusions and Future Work 
There are many reasons why we need to deal with deceptive verbal and nonverbal interaction. In this paper we 
looked at natural conversations and why such conversations profit from not always showing true feelings, we 
looked at commerce and negotiation situation where users are not assumed to show their feelings, we looked at 
game, training and simulation environments where users have to compete, obey and adjust their behavior to 
demands and preferences of their coaches, their team mates, and their virtual opponents. In all these situations 
some modeling of non-cooperative behavior, some modeling of empathic behavior, some modeling of persuasive 
behavior, and some modeling of coaching or teaching behavior is required. In games we see research attempts to 
make the ‘non-playing’ characters more autonomous by providing them with intelligence and social behavior. 
Clearly, when this is done, these characters need to know about competition, disagreement, aggressiveness and 
violence. There is also discussion about bringing games more into the real world, that is, it is expected that in the 
future more competitive situations will be designed in the real world that allow playful deception [22]. 
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